Form and Essence according to Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983)
Joshua P. Hochschild
Society for the History of European Ideas, Conference IV: “On Form and Formal Causation”
Budapest, September 11-12, 2025
Caponigri on “ser” vs. “estar”:
The linguistic origin of [ser], in contrast to the verb «estar,» lies for Zubiri in the fact that ser is a verb of reality, not of mere existence. This is fortified by its grammatical use; the essence as a system of constitutive notes as constitutive of the reality which is («sido»). «Ser» means «sido,» to be, in this sense over the distribution of its form (cf. «estar siendo» [“to be being,” or “being in the process of being,” – jph]), not prior to reality (realidad). «Ser» = ultimate act of the real insofar as the real «is.» Therefore, «ser» is not transcendental in the order of the real «as real» and not as «is». A «thing» («cosa») in its actuality = «ente» which embraces reality ser-estar. Aristotle is mistaken in taking substantive «ser» as ultimate in the order of being; rather it is posterior to «realidad». The world, «mundo,» is the realm of «ser» in a more basic sense than it is the realm of «estar.» [Caponigri, “Glossary,” in On Essence, p. 477]
Zubiri on essence as a system of constitutive notes:
In its most innocuous acceptance, essence is purely and simply the «what» of anything, that is, the totality of the notes which it may possess, taken in their internal unity. This «what» however, immediately exhibits itself to us in our experience as something more or less variable, while, despite this variability, the thing remains the same. Essence, then, is the internal unity of those notes which presumably constitute the sameness of a thing, and prevent its confusion with other things. This conclusion forces us to seek, among these notes which pertain to the sameness of the thing, those which strictly cannot be absent from that thing, and which that thing necessarily must possess if it is not to cease to be that which it was in the earlier acceptance. The unitary conjunction of these notes, which the real thing necessarily possesses, is what, in the formal and proper sense, we call essence. This unity of the essence possesses two fundamental characteristics. In the first place, it is a primary unity, because in it the different notes are nothing more than abstract moments in which the original unity deploys itself. In the second place, since not all the notes which a real thing may possess hic et nunc are essential to it, it follows that the essence, in contrast to everything else the thing has or may have or may not have, constitutes, in its unity, the true reality of the thing in question, the principle of its other notes. Primary unity and true reality in the order of principles: here, then are the two characteristics which the essence possesses as the internal unity of that which the thing cannot fail to have, which necessarily belongs to it. [On Essence, 121-122]
Zubiri on substance vs. substantivity:
Classical metaphysics has resorted to the concept of substance. The real is thus substance. None of its properties has reality except in dependence upon substance as on its subject. The properties are accidents of the substance. The substance is the subject to which the properties are inherent as accidents.
However, I find this unacceptable. Radically and formally, the real is not substantiality, but substantivity. Among other things, our philosophy needs a metaphysics of substantivity. [“Theological Reflections on the Eucharist”]
Zubiri on Eucharistic real presence as “Transubstantivation”:
Classical metaphysics has thought that the real presence is a consequence of the conversion. Since there can be no accident without substance, the substantial conversion determines the presence of the substance of Christ in the bread. Whether this conversion is understood as a formal conversion (according to St. Thomas) or as an equivalent conversion (according to Suárez), the basis of the real presence is always seen as the conversion. With all due respect, I propose a different view. I believe that the conversion is the consequence of the real presence of Christ in the food-bread. The real presence is the basis of the conversion. Only because Christ is present in the bread, this bread, as food substantivity, has lost its material substantivity and acquired a substantivity of spiritual food. By the real presence of Christ the bread is converted ratione alimenti. The conversion formally affects the condition of the bread.
Here we have, then, the fact of the real presence of Christ conceptualized as transsubstantivation. [“Theological Reflections on the Eucharist”]
Zubiri’s critique of “entification”:
The identification of what is real with being is an important consequence of the acceptance of Greek philosophy. It is what I have termed the entification of reality: things are not entities unless they have being. Now, to be is always but a subsequent act of the real. Whatsoever a being may be, it is always and only being “of” the real. Subsequentness is the precise meaning of this “of”. Therefore, reality and entity are not formally identical. Prior to being entities, and precisely in order to be able to be so, things begin by being real. The ground of being is reality. [Man and God, p. 101]
Selected works by Zubiri in English:
Dynamic Structure of Reality, trans. Nelson R. Orringer (Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003).
The Fundamental Problems of Western Metaphysics, trans. Joaquín Redondo (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010).
Man and God, trans. Joaquín Redondo (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2009).
Nature, History, God, trans. Thomas B. Fowler (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981).
On Essence, trans. Robert Caponigri (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1980).
“Theological Reflections on the Eucharist,” trans. Maria D’Ambrosio (Zubiri Foundation of North America, 1997). (https://www.zubiri.org/works/eucharst.htm)